Abstract. Efficient and privacy-preserving constructions for search functionality on encrypted data is important issues for data outsourcing, and data retrieval, etc. Fully secure anonymous Hierarchical ID-Based Encryption (HIBE) schemes is useful primitives that can be applicable to searchable encryptions [4] , such as ID-based searchable encryption, temporary searchable encryption [1], and anonymous forward secure HIBE [9] . We propose a fully secure anonymous HIBE scheme with constant size ciphertexts.
Introduction
Shamir introduced the notion of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) which is a public-key cryptosystem being able to use any string, such as e-mail, as a public key [20] , and Boneh and Franklin proposed the first IBE scheme using pairing [5] . Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) is an extension allowing high level users to delegate their key generation ability to the low level users [16, 15] . Abdalla et. al. introduced the notion of anonymous IBE and anonymous HIBE that satisfy an additional privacy requirement such that no adversary can obtain information for the recipient's identity ID from ciphertexts if she do not have a private key of ID or its ancestors' [1] . Both anonymous IBE and anonymous HIBE is useful primitives that can be applicable to encryption systems allowing search functionality on encrypted data [4, 1, 9, 7, 21] .
The first realization of an anonymous HIBE scheme is proposed by Boyen and Waters [9] . Since Boyen and Waters' anonymous HIBE, several approaches to build an anonymous HIBE scheme are introduced [22, 19, 14] . However, all previous anonymous HIBE schemes proved their securities in the selective security model that restricts the adversary to commit the target ID before that public parameters are generated by the challenger in the security game. Selective security notion does not reflect real adversaries' behaviors sufficiently. In contrast to selective security model, full security model allows the adversary to be able to choose the target identity after obtaining public system parameters and private keys which are adaptively chosen by the adversary. Therefore, full security is stronger security notion than selective security, and it reflects real world adversary well. We propose a HIBE scheme satisfying following properties together, full security, anonymity, and constant size ciphertexts.
Our Contributions: Our construction is inspired by two HIBE schemes proposed by Lewko and Waters [18] , and Seo et. al. [19] . The HIBE scheme in [18] achieves full security and constant size ciphertexts, but not anonymity. On the other hand, Seo et. al.'s HIBE scheme attains anonymity and constant size ciphertexts, but not full security. We note that our construction is not a simple combination of two schemes. Let us explain what is a hard task if we combine techniques in two schemes. Seo et. al.'s ideas to obtain anonymity are blinding public parameters and ciphertexts, and adding re-randomization subkeys into private keys. In their scheme, adding re-randomization subkeys into private keys does not impact the security proof since re-randomization subkeys do not contain the master secret key used to decrypt. More precisely, in the security proof of selective model, the simulator know the target ID * before he generates public parameters, so that he can generate public parameters to allow to be able to generate all private keys except for the target ID * . That is, when the simulator generates public parameters, the element hard to compute in the underlying hard problem is embedded to the private key for ID * . Hence the simulator can generate almost all elements except the private key for target ID * and its ancestors', and so he can easily generate re-randomization subkeys for all private keys. However, this strategy cannot apply to the full security model directly. Since the simulator cannot see target ID * before generating public parameters, the simulator should be able to generate all private keys to reply key extraction queries. Therefore, adding re-randomization subkeys to private keys is not an easy work contrast to the scheme in [19] .
We construct the scheme in bilinear groups of composite order of four primes, and give the provable security of our construction under six new static assumptions. Even though our construction use composite order group of four primes, we claim that our construction is practical in comparison with other anonymous HIBE schemes. All selective secure (H)IBE scheme can be transfered to the full secure scheme by increasing group size [2] . This transformation increases, however, the group size exponentially according to the maximum hierarchical depth, eventually resulting schemes are very inefficient compare to our construction. Moreover, assumptions used to prove confidentiality and anonymity of our scheme are static (but not standard). I.e. assumptions are independent from the maximum number of the adversary's private key queries.
Applications: Anonymous IBE and HIBE have variety applications in search on encrypted data of public-key cryptosystems, such as Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) [4, 1] . PEKS is a useful primitives for constructing secure audit logs [24, 13] , secure multidimensional range query [21] , conjunctive keyword search [7] , and anonymous credential [10] . ID-based searchable encryptions and temporary searchable encryptions are extensions of PEKS. For example, we can use two level anonymous HIBE scheme where the first level is used for user's identities and the second level is used for keywords. This is an combination of IBE and PEKS, called Identity-Based Encryption with Keyword Search (IBEKS) proposed in [1] . In IBEKS scheme, each user in the first level of anonymous HIBE scheme can generate all tokens for keywords chosen by himself using his private key without requiring to a central authority. Public-key Encryption with Temporary Keyword Search (PETKS) is also a useful application of anonymous HIBE [1] . In PETKS scheme, intermediate nodes in hierarchy of anonymous HIBE is corresponds to time periods and leaf nodes are corresponds to keywords. The time travel of PETKS scheme is defined as in forward secure public-key encryption that is an important application of HIBE [11] . Then, users can generate a token for keyword which is available in temporary time periods defined by users. Forward secure public-key encryption [11] and forward-secure HIBE scheme [25] can be constructed using a HIBE scheme as a building block. If we use an anonymous HIBE scheme instead a HIBE scheme, then we can obtain an anonymous forward secure HIBE scheme [9] .
Definitions
In this section we define anonymous HIBE scheme and give their security models.
Anonymous HIBE scheme
Every user of HIBE scheme has an ID consisting of a vector as a public key such as ID = [I 1 , · · · , I k ] where k means user's position in the hierarchy. We sometimes denote ID| k to emphasize the length of ID instead of ID when the length of ID is k. The root node of hierarchy means Private Key Generator (PKG), denoted by ID| 0 . Definition 1. A HIBE scheme consists of four probabilistic algorithms, Setup, KeyGen, Enc and Dec algorithms as follows.
Setup(λ, ) → {params, MSK }. Setup takes the security parameter λ and the maximum hierarchical depth as input, and it generates public system parameters, denoted by params and the master secret key, denoted by M SK = P vk ID| 0 . params includes the message space M, the ciphertext space CT and the identity space I. M SK is kept by PKG as secret values.
KeyGen generates the private key P vk ID| k of the identity ID| k using the private key P vk ID|τ for the identity ID| τ where τ < k and ID| τ is an ancestor identity of ID| k . Enc(params, ID, M )→ {CT }. Enc outputs a ciphertext CT ∈ CT for a message M ∈ M and a recipient identity ID ∈ I. Dec(P vk ID , CT )→ {M }. Dec returns the message M ∈ M.
Enc and Dec have to satisfy the consistency constraint such that for every identity ID ∈ I and the corresponding private key P vk ID generated by KeyGen and every message M ∈ M, Dec(P vk ID , Enc(params, ID, M )) = M where the probability goes over all randomness used in all algorithms above.
Security Models
We deal with two kinds of security notions, the confidentiality and the anonymity. Confidentiality means that ciphertexts does not leak information about corresponding plaintexts, and the anonymity means recipient's privacy. Both of security notions are defined by games between an adversary A and a challenger C, IND-ID-CPA game for confidentiality and ANON-ID-CPA game for anonymity.
IND-ID-CPA Game:
Setup. C runs Setup and gives A public system parameters and retains the master secret key as secret values. Query Phase 1. A adaptively issues identities ID. C generates P vk ID by running KeyGen, and sends P vk ID to A. Challenge. A outputs two equal length messages M 0 , M 1 and a target identity ID * . The target identity ID * and its prefixes have not queried before. Then, C flips a random coin β and makes the challenge ciphertext, Enc(params, ID * , M β ). Then sends it to the adversary.
Query Phase 2. Repeat Query Phase 1. The only restriction is A cannot query for the target identity ID * and its prefixes. Guess. A outputs a guess β of β, and then wins if β = β .
The advantage of A in the above game is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the probability of β = β and 1/2. Definition 2. We say that an HIBE scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure if for any polynomial time adversary, its advantage in IND-ID-CPA game is negligible.
ANON-ID-CPA Game:
Setup. C runs Setup and gives A the public system parameters and retains the master secret key as secret values. Query Phase 1. A adaptively issues identities ID. C generates P vk ID by running KeyGen, and sends P vk ID to A. Challenge. A outputs message M and two target identities ID * 0 and ID * 1 . Both of two target identities and their prefixes have not queried before. Then, C flips a random coin β and makes the challenge ciphertext, Enc(params, ID * β , M ). Then sends it to the adversary. Query Phase 2. Repeat Query Phase 1. The only restriction is A cannot query for the target identities and their prefixes. Guess. A outputs a guess β of β, and then wins if β = β .
The advantage of A in ANON-ID-CPA game is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the probability of β = β and 1/2. Definition 3. We say that an HIBE scheme is ANON-ID-CPA secure if for any polynomial time adversary, its advantage in ANON-ID-CPA game is negligible.
We can extend the above security notions to the CCA security notions, IND-ID-CCA and ANON-ID-CCA by allowing the adversary to use the decryption oracle in Query Phases of both games. CCA security can be achieved from CPA security by using techniques that are method of transforming from CPA-secure ( + 1)-level HIBE to CCA-secure -level HIBE, for example [3, 8] . Therefore in this paper we only focus on CPA security notions.
Background in Mathematics and Complexity Assumptions

Bilinear Groups of Composite Order
We will use a bilinear group of composite order n = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 . Bilinear groups of composite order were introduced by Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [6] . Many literatures make cryptographic schemes over composite order bilinear groups [6, 7, 17, 22, 23, 19, 18] .
Let G be a group generating algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as a input and outputs a tuple
where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 and p 4 are distinct primes, G and G T are cyclic groups of order n = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 , and e: G × G → G T is a non-degenerate bilinear map; i.e., e satisfies the following properties:
3. (efficiently computable) There exists an efficient algorithm that computes bilinear map e in polynomial time with respect to λ.
We assume that group operations in G and G T are all computable in polynomial time with respect to λ. Furthermore, we assume that descriptions of G and G T contain generators as well as identity elements 1 G , 1 G T of G and G T , respectively. We will use a notation
We use notations G p i p j and G p i p j p k to denote subgroups of order p i p j and p i p j p k , respectively. Since G has a composite order n = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 , subgroups with order as a factor of N exist, hence such notations make sense.
If X is a generator of G, then
, respectively, and denote to X 2 , X 3 , X 4 , respectively. We note that e(R i , R j ) = 1 for distinct i and j, and all random elements R i ∈ G p i , R j ∈ G p j . This is followed from the fact that e(R i , R j ) = e(X a i , X b j ) for some integers a, b ∈ Z N , and e(X a i ,
Complexity Assumptions
We need six complexity assumptions to prove the security of our anonymous HIBE construction. Our assumptions are not standard assumptions, however, these guarantee the security against adversarial strategy that does not use the properties of group representation if the finding nontrivial factors of the group order is hard. The hardness of our assumptions relies on the theorems of Katz, Sahai, and Waters [17] .
Assumption 1:
For a given group generator G, let the following distribution be P 1 (λ).
Give (D, T ) to the adversary B. Then B outputs β , and succeeds if β = β . We define the advantage of the adversary B above, denote to Adv1 G,B (λ), in group generated by G to be the absolute value of the difference of the success probability of the adversary and 1/2, where the probability is over the distribution P 1 (λ) and the random coins of B.
Definition 4. We say that a group generator G satisfies Assumption 1 if Adv1 G,B (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial time adversary B.
Assumption 2:
For a given group generator G, let the following distribution be P 2 (λ).
Give (D, T ) to the adversary B. Then B outputs β , and succeeds if β = β . We define the advantage of the adversary B above, denote to Adv2 G,B (λ), in group generated by G to be the absolute value of the difference of the success probability of B and 1/2, where the probability is over the distribution P 2 (λ) and the random coins of B.
Definition 5. We say that a group generator G satisfies Assumption 2 if Adv2 G,B (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial time adversary B.
Assumption 3:
For a given group generator G, let the following distribution be P 3 (λ).
Give (D, T ) to the adversary B. Then A outputs β , and succeeds if β = β . We define the advantage of the adversary B above, denote to Adv3 G,B (λ), in groups generated by G to be the absolute value of the difference of the success probability of B and 1/2, where the probability is over the distribution P 3 (λ) and the random coins of B.
Definition 6. We say that a group generator G satisfies Assumption 3 if Adv3 G,B (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial time adversary B.
Assumption 4:
For a given group generator G, let the following distribution be P 4 (λ).
(p1, p2, p3, p4, G, GT , e)
Give (D, T ) to the adversary B. Then A outputs β , and succeeds if β = β . We define the advantage of the adversary B above, denote to Adv4 G,B (λ), in groups generated by G to be the absolute value of the difference of the success probability of B and 1/2, where the probability is over the distribution P 4 (λ) and the random coins of B.
Definition 7. We say that a group generator G satisfies Assumption 4 if Adv4 G,B (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial time adversary B.
Assumption 5:
For a given group generator G, let the following distribution be P 5 (λ).
Give (D, T ) to the adversary B. Then B outputs β , and succeeds if β = β . We define the advantage of the adversary B above, denote to Adv5 G,B (λ), in groups generated by G to be the absolute value of the difference of the success probability of B and 1/2, where the probability is over the distribution P 5 (λ) and the random coins of B.
Definition 8. We say that a group generator G satisfies Assumption 5 if Adv5 G,B (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial time adversary B.
Assumption 6:
We uses Assumption 6 to prove the anonymity of our anonymous HIBE construction. For a given group generator G, let the following distribution be P 6 (λ).
Give (D, T ) to the adversary B. Then B outputs β , and succeeds if β = β . We define the advantage of the adversary B above, denote to Adv6 G,B (λ), in groups generated by G to be the absolute value of the difference of the success probability of B and 1/2, where the probability is over the distribution P 6 (λ) and the random coins of B.
Definition 9. We say that a group generator G satisfies Assumption 6 if Adv6 G,B (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial time adversary B.
Construction
In this section we proposed a fully secure anonymous HIBE with constant size ciphertexts. We build a scheme in bilinear groups G of composite order of product of four primes, n = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 . We utilize subgroups G p 1 , G p 2 , G p 3 , G p 4 of G for different usage. All meaningful information are embedded in a subgroup G p 1 . Subgroups G p 3 and G p 4 are respectively used private keys and public parameters to look like random. Subgroup G p 2 is not appeared in real scheme. We use G p 2 only for security proof.
All public parameters and ciphertexts are blinded by random elements of G p 4 , so ciphertexts does not leak ID information. If the private key does not have blinding factors in G p 4 , blinding factors of ciphertexts will be removed during paring operation in the decryption procedure. HIBE schemes usually use public parameters to re-randomize children's key in delegation algorithm, however, if public parameters have blinding factors, we cannot use public parameters to re-randomize children's key. If then, decryption algorithm will not work correctly. Therefore we need to add re-randomization subkey to the private key. We now describe our construction with keeping this idea in mind.
Setup(λ, ): First, the setup algorithm runs group generator G and obtains (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , G, G T , e). Next, it chooses random elements g, h, , w) , and
Lastly, it publishes the params and retain the M SK as secret values. Enc(params, ID, M ): Parse ID to [I 1 , · · · , I k ]. Enc picks a random integer s ∈ Z n and random elementsR 4 ,R 4 ∈ G p 4 . A random element of G p 4 can be chosen by raising X 4 to random exponents from Z N . Next, it sets
KeyGen algorithm picks random integers r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N and random elements
The private key P vk ID consists of two subkeys P vk
and P vk (r)
is used for decryption and delegation, and P vk
ID is used for re-randomization. It sets
KeyGen(P vk ID| k−1 , ID |k ): Given a private key P vk ID| k−1 for 2 ≤ k ≤ , this algorithm derives the private key for ID| k . Parse P vk ID| k−1 to P vk
. This algorithm consists of two steps, Delegate step and Re-randomize step. In Delegate step, it generates the private key for child, ID| k . The result of Delegate step is sufficient to decrypt the ciphertext for ID| k , however, the randomness of these keys are associated with parents keys. It means that distributions of private keys generated by Delegate step are different from private keys generated by M SK. We set two distributions to be same by carrying out Re-randomize step after Delegate step.
Step 1 (Delegate Step):
Step 2 (Re-randomize Step): Choose two random integers s, t ∈ Z N and random elements R
be generated by raising X 3 to random exponent from Z n . P vk
are respectively re-randomized as follows:
Dec(P vk ID , CT ): Parse ID, CT and
We can easily check the correctness of the Dec algorithm for a valid ciphertext so that we omit details.
Security Analysis
To prove the security of our anonymous HIBE scheme, we take the proof methodology of [23, 18] . In other word, we first define semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys, and we will show that the real security game is computationally indistinguishable from a game that all query results are semi-functional ones. In the real game, the simulator can always check whether the challenge ciphertext is valid or not by generating the corresponding private key himself. Therefore it is uneasy to make reduction to the hard problem. If the simulator, however, can only generate semi-functional ones (ciphertexts and keys), he cannot check by himself the validity of the ciphertexts since semi-functional keys cannot decrypt the semifunctional ciphertext except for the special case. Therefore it is possible to make reduction to the hard problem. Semi-functional ciphertexts are of the form
where C 0 , C 1 , C 2 are the result of Enc algorithm, g 2 ∈ G p 2 , and x, z c R ← Z N . Semi-functional keys are of the form
Since elements of G p 2 are used in the semi-functional ones, Dec algorithm will remove elements of G p 2 if it takes semi-functional keys and normal ciphertexts, or normal keys and semi-functional ciphertexts. However, Dec algorithm outputs the result multiplied by additional term e(g 2 , g 2 ) xγ(zc−z k ) if it takes semi-functional keys and semifunctional ciphertexts. If z k = z c , then the additional term is 1 G T , so that decryption will be correct.
We uses a hybrid argument to prove the confidentiality. The first game is the real IND-ID-CPA game, denote to Game Real . The second game Game Restricted restricts that the adversary cannot query for the private key for identities which are prefixes of the challenge identity modulus p 2 , and remains others are same to Game Real . Next, we define q + 1 number of games, Game k where 0 ≤ k ≤ q, and q is the number of key extraction queries made by the adversary. In Game k , the adversary is given semi-functional ciphertext as the challenge ciphertext, and the first k key extraction results are also semi-functional keys, and others are remained like Game Restricted . There leaves last game Game M hiding that is like Game q except the challenge ciphertext. In Game M hiding the first component of the challenge ciphertext is a random element of G T . Then the adversary cannot get any information about the challenge message in Game M hiding , so that his advantage is information theoretically zero in Game M hiding . The security proof consists of the proofs of indistinguishability between each sequential games. Theorem 1. Our HIBE scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure if the group generator G holds Assumption 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Lemma 1. If a group generator G satisfies Assumption 2, 3 and 4, there is no adversary such that the difference of the advantage in between Game Real and Game Restricted is non-negligible.
proof. Suppose that A output identities ID 0 and ID 1 such that ID 0 = ID 1 mod n and ID 0 = ID 1 mod p 2 . Then simulator S can compute a nontrivial factor of n by taking gcd(ID 0 − ID 1 , N ). Let gcd(ID 0 − ID 1 , N )=a, and b = N a . Then we consider the following two cases: (Three cases cover all possibilities.)
In case 1, S will break Assumption 2. Given instance of Assumption 2, g, X 1 X 2 , X 3 , Y 2 Y 3 , X 4 and T , S simulates using g, X 3 , and X 4 , and then obtains b from A. (Given g, X 3 , X 4 S can simulate with the adversary A.) S checks p 1 |b by testing
In case 2, S will break Assumption 3. Given instance of Assumption 3. X 1 , Y 2 Y 3 , X 3 , X 4 and T , S simulates using X 1 , X 3 and X 4 , and then obtains b. S checks p 3 |b by testing
. If the equality holds, then G p 2 part of T is same to Y 2 . Otherwise, G p 2 part of T is random.
In case 3, S will break Assumption 4. Given instance of Assumption 4. X 1 , Y 2 Y 4 , X 3 , X 4 and T , S simulates using X 1 , X 3 and X 4 , and then obtains b. S checks p 4 |b by testing X b 4 = 1. Next, S checks whether e((Y 2 Y 4 ) b , T ) = 1 G T or not. If the equality holds, then T is chosen from G p 4 . Otherwise, T is chosen from G p 2 p 4 .
Lemma 2. If a group generator G satisfies Assumption 1, there is no adversary such that the difference of the advantage in between Game Restricted and Game 0 is non-negligible.
proof. Simulator S is given the instance of Assumption 1 ,G, n, g, X 3 , X 4 and T . Setup: S chooses random integers b, a 1 , · · · , a , α ∈ Z n and random elements R 4,g , R 4,h , R 4,u 1 ,· · · , R 4,u ∈ G p 4 . (S can compute random elements in G p 4 from randomly exponents of X 4 .) It sets and sends
Query Phase: S returns to private query for ID = [I 1 , · · · , I k ]. Since S knows M SK, he can generate all private keys. Challenge: S is given ID * = [I * 1 , · · · , I * k ] and two messages M 0 , M 1 from A. S tosses a random coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and returns
Lemma 3. If a group generator G satisfies Assumption 2, 3, there is no adversary such that the difference of the advantage in between Game k−1 and Game k is non-negligible.
To prove Lemma 3, we use hybrid steps, too. We define a sequence of gamesGame
which locate between Game k−1 and Game k . InGame (0) k , G p 2 parts of P vk (d) are same to P vk (r) of k-th key query result, and others are remained like Game k−1 . Iñ
k , G p 2 parts of first τ components of P vk (d) are independent from first τ components of P vk (r) , and others are remained likeGame
is identically equal to Game k . 
Query Phase: Since S knows M SK, he can generate all normal private keys. For first i-th (i < k) queries, S generates normal private keys, and multiplies a random power of Y 2 Y 3 to every component of keys, and then he returns to the adversary. These keys are distributed as semi-functional keys. For i > k case, S returns normal keys. For k-th query for ID = [I 1 , · · · , I j ], S chooses a random integer t ∈ Z n and random elements R
3, ∈ G p 3 and respectively sets P vk ID as follows:
is independently random from params and T since b + j i=1 a i I i mod p 2 and a i mod p 2 for i ∈ [j + 1, ] are independently random from params and T . G p 2 part of P vk (r) is same to P vk (d) , so that this is a key inGame
and two messages M 0 , M 1 from A. S tosses a random coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and returns the challenge ciphertext
where R 4 and R 4 are chosen at random from G p 4 . Note that
Since for all ID queried by A, ID mod p 2 is not equal to ID * mod p 2 , z c mod p 2 is independent random from z k mod p 2 , and a i mod p 2 for i ∈ [j + 1, ] used in the k-th key query. Hence, all randomness used in the challenge ciphertexts are independently random from all other randomness used in the game. If S generates the corresponding semi-functional ciphertext of k-th key query, and tests whether k-th key is semi-functional key, then decryption will always work without respect to that the k-th key is semi-functional key or not since z c = z k . Guess: S transfers output of A.
Lemma 5. If a group generator G satisfies Assumption 3, there is no adversary such that the difference of the advantage in betweenGame (0) k andGame (1) k is non-negligible. proof. Simulator S is given the instance of Assumption 3 ,G, n, g, X 1 , Y 2 Y 3 , X 3 , X 4 and T . Setup: S chooses random integers b, a 1 , · · · , a , α and random elements R 4,g , R 4,h , R 4,u 1 ,· · · , R 4,u ∈ G p 4 . (S can compute random elements in G p 4 from randomly exponents of X 4 .) It sets and sends
Query Phase: Since S knows M SK, he can generate all normal private keys. For first ith (i < k) queries, S generates normal private keys, and multiplies a random power of Y 2 Y 3 to every component of keys, and then he returns to the adversary. These keys are distributed as semi-functional keys. For i > k case, S returns normal keys. For k-th query for ID = [I 1 , · · · , I j ], S chooses random integers r 1 , r 2 , t, t j+1 , · · · , t ∈ Z n and random elements R ID as follows: k . If T is random element in G p 2 p 3 , then above is a key inGame (1) k . Challenge: S is given ID * = [I * 1 , · · · , I * k ] and two messages M 0 , M 1 from A. S tosses a random coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and returns the challenge ciphertext
where R 4 and R 4 are random elements in G p 4 and s, s , s ∈ Z n are random integers. Guess: S transfers output of A.
Similarly we can prove indistinguishability betweenGame k (τ ) andGame k (τ + 1) for τ ∈ [1, ]. Simulator can generate all normal keys, semi-functional keys, the challenge ciphertext, and P vk ID using T for its G p 2 p 3 part. Since there is no technical difference from the security proof of Lemma 5, we give following lemma without proof.
Lemma 6. If a group generator G satisfies Assumption 3, there is no adversary such that the difference of the advantage in betweenGame Lemma 7. If a group generator G satisfies Assumption 5, there is no adversary such that the difference of the advantage in between Game q and Game M hiding is non-negligible.
proof. Simulator S is given the instance of Assumption 5 ,G, n, g, X 1 X 2 , X 3 , Y 1 Y 2 , Z 2 Z 3 , X 4 and T . Setup: S chooses random integers b, a 1 , · · · , a , α ∈ Z n and random elements R 4,g , R 4,h , R 4,u 1 ,· · · , R 4,u ∈ G p 4 . (S can compute random elements in G p 4 from randomly exponents of X 4 .) It sets and sends params ← [G, ns, G = gR 4 ,g , H = g b R 4 ,h , U 1 = g a 1 R 4 ,u 1 , · · · , U = g a R 4 ,u , X 3 , X 4 , E = e(g, X 1 X 2 )] to A. Keep [g = g, h = g b , u 1 = g a 1 , · · · , u = g a ]. Then an unknown master secret key w is X 1 . Query Phase: S returns to private query for ID = [I 1 , · · · , I j ]. S chooses random integers r 1 , t, t j+1 , · · · , t , r 2 , s, s j+1 , · · · , s ∈ Z n and random elements R 3, ∈ G p 3 . X 3 can be used for generating random elements in G p 3 . He sets a semi-functional key P vk 
